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STUDENT NOTES
time of delivery, but construed acceptance as being at the exact
moment the grantee actually consented to the transfer. The court
deemed it essential for the purposes of justice that the actual time of
acceptance be considered as the beginning of ownership of the grantee.
Probably this same result is reached in the majority-rule states'
If the American rules were interpreted literally, injustice would
result in certain instances. However, the courts have shown a tendency
to integrate the two rulings in order to achieve justice in particular
cases, e.g., the minority holds like the majority in infant cases, and,
the majority holds like the minority where the rights of third parties
intervene. The two American views are sufficiently flexible to allow
a broad interpretation when justice demands. It would therefore
appear that there is little difference in many jurisdictions in the
application of these rules'
JAMES COLLIER
THEORIES AS TO THE NATURE OF EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
The entire subject of equitable servitudes is somewhat con-
fused, most of the confusion probably arising because of a failure to
understand their nature. It is generally agreed that an equitable
servitude is a restriction on the use of land enforceable in equity
between contracting parties or their successors with notice. Their
development may be accredited to judicial legislation originating with
the English case of Tulk v. Moxhay.' The result in this case was ob-
tamed on the theory that the covenant should be enforced in order to
prevent unjust enrichment on the part of the purchaser who pre-
sumably had paid less for the property because of the servitude. This
rationalization has, however, been definitely repudiated.
Several other theories have been advanced by courts of equity
in enforcing such agreements. The two theories most often relied
upon by the courts are; first, such restrictions are enforceable as con-
tracts concerning the land;' and second, they are enforceable sub-
stantially as servitudes attached to the land
l' Arnegaard v Arnegaard, 7 N.D. 475, 75 N. W 797, 41 L.R.A. 258
(1898)
" If the different jurisdictions are to reach the same results, facts
similar to those in the principal case would perhaps cause the greatest
difficulty
2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848)
CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1937) 117-118; Royes v Hose-
good, 2 Ch. 388 (1900)
See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1434-1438; Stone,
The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of a Stranger to a Contract (1918)
18 Col. L. Rev 291, Ames, Specific Performance for and Against
Strangers to a Contract (1904) 17 Harv L. Rev 174; Giddings, Re-
strictions Upon the Use of Land (1892) 5 Harv L. Rev 274.
'PouND, PROGRESS OF THE LAW (1918-1919) Pound, Equitable
Servitudes (1920) 33 Harv L. Rev 813; CLARK, EQUITY (1919) 118-
119; Keasbey, Restrictions Upon the Use of Land (1893) 6 Harv L. Rev
280; POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) Secs. 1295, 1693.
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Proponents of the contract theory have been influenced by the
language used- and the results obtained in Tulk v. Moxhay. In this
case the court, thinking purely in terms of specific performance said,
'. the question is not whether the covenant runs with the land,
but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner
inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with
notice of which he purchased." 5 This, together with the fact that equity
usually gives specific performance to land contracts, has led many
judges and writers to adopt the contract theory in totoY In Wilson
Co. v. Gordon, involving the sale-of land in a restricted area, the court
said, " there is not here involved any grant of an actual interest,
title, or direct easement in the land itself, of another, but strictly a
restrictive covenant. '7 In many cases involving equitable servi-
tudes it is possible and often convenient to use the contractual peg on
which to hang the decision.
The more persuasive and substantially more logical theory, how-
ever, seems to be that these covenants run with and attach to the
land in equity This theory has been advanced by Dean Pound and
other learned writers!- In Withers v. Ward,' Ritz, J., said,
"9 the right to have them enforced, so far as the plaintiff is
concerned, is one that is attached to his real estate. It is a part
of his real estate, and when the owner of another lot in the sub-
division attempts to violate one of these restrictions he is taking
from all the other owners part of their estate. He is not merely
committing a trespass upon it. He is destroying it, and equity will
take jurisdiction by injunctive process to prevent one from in-
flicting permanent injury upon the real estate of another."
New York has held such interests are property rights, in condem-
nation proceedings." In Peters v. Buckner,. the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that the owner of a lot in a subdivision in winch all of
the lots were restricted to residential use has a property interest m
each of the other lots which could not be taken for public use without
compensation. The owner in that case was held to be entitled to a
writ of mandamus compelling a school district to award him compensa-
tion before it could build a school building on the lot across the street
from the plaintiff's land. Woodson, J., said, "The covenants and
agreements in the deeds. , create and vest in them, as owners,
a legal right of property which is an appurtenance to their
respective lots."''
Where land subject to an equitable servitude, is acquired by
adverse possession the servitude is not destroyed even though the
52 Phillips, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1145.
'See note 3, supra.
224 S.W 703 (Tex., 1920)
S See note 4, supra.
'86 W Va. 558, 104 S. E. 96 (1920)
"Flynn v N. Y. W & B. Ry Co., 218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913 (1916)
288 Mo. 618, 232 S. W 1024, 17 A. L. R. 543 (1921)
Id. at - 232S. W at 1027.
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acquirer had no notice of it It would, therefore, appear that the
doctrine of equitable servitudes operates as. an equitable appendix
to the law of real property
It is believed, however, that it is not advisable to place equitable
servitudes unequivocally in either of the aforementioned categories,
since they possess certain characteristics inherent in both contract and
property rights. It must be admitted that as between the covenantor
and covenantee the restriction is contractual, and that all equitable
servitudes have their origin in contracts. However, by no stretch
of the imagination could it be said that the relation between the
remote grantee of the covenantee and one who takes by adverse
possession from the covenantor is contractual- Nevertheless, the
equitable servitude can be enforced against one who takes by adverse
possession since he is not a purchaser for value.'
It may be concluded, then, that equitable, servitudes are both
contractual and real (pertaining to realty) in their nature. The
result in a particular case may be influenced, or even determined, by
whether the court is more persuaded by the contract phase of the
servitude than by the property phase, or vice versa, at the time the
decision is made.
IRA G STEPHENSON
TORTS-LIABILITY OF ELECTRIC COMPANY FOR
CURRENT ESCAPING FROM POWER LINE
In Chase v. Washzngton Power Company,' two chicken hawks be-
came engaged in an aerial battle in the course of which their talons
interlocked, and they fell, so attached, between the defendant's power
line and guy wire. One touched the highly charged power line and
the other touched the guy wire, thereby establishing a connection.
From the connection thus made, the current ran down the guy wire
and escaped into a wire fence which had been allowed to sag against
the guy wire. The current was transmitted through the wire fence
to the plaintiff's barn, to which the fence was attached. As a result,
the plaintiff's barn was destroyed by fire and some other buildings
were damaged. The Supreme Court of Idaho, in affirming a judg-
ment for the plaintiff, found that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to find negligence on the part of the defendant and reasoned
that since birds had, at other times, caused disturbances on the power
line, it was foreseeable that they might make such a connection as
the one made here.
This case raises some interesting problems, as it may be questioned
whether there was really any negligence on the part of the power
"In re Nisbet and Potts Contract, 1 Ch. 386 (1906).
" See note 12, supra.
111 P (2d) 872 (Idaho, 1941)
